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QUESTION:
What strategies can be chosen by rational
players who know the structure of the game 
and the preferences of their opponents and 
who recognize each other’s rationality and 
knowledge?
Keywords: knowledge, rationality, recognition of each other’s 
knowledge and rationality3
Modular approach
Module 1: representation of belief and knowledge of an 
individual (Hintikka, 1962; Kripke, 1963).
Module 2: extension to many individuals.
Common belief and common knowledge 
(“recognition of each other’s belief / knowledge”)
Module 3: definition of rationality in games 
(relationship between choice and beliefs)
QUESTION: what are the implications of rationality and 
common belief of rationality in games?4
Module 1
representation of beliefs and knowledge of an individual
Finite set of states W and a binary relation B on W .  
a B b  means   “at state a the individual considers state b possible”
Notation: { } :   ( ) w w w w ¢ ¢ ÎW = B B set of states considered possible at w
PROPERTIES
1. ( )                                              seriality
2. if   ( )  then   ( ) ( )      transitivity
3. if   ( )   then   ( ) ( )      euclideannes
w
w w w w
w w w w
¹ Æ
¢ ¢ Î Í




, , w w¢ " ÎW5
Belief operator on events: : 2 2 B
W W ®
For   , ( ) E BE if and only if E w w Í W Î Í B
EXAMPLE:
a b g d
¬p p p ¬p
( ) ( ) { , }
( ) ( ) { }






Let  { , } :  the event that represents the proposition 







Properties of the belief operator: E " Í W
1.            (consistency: 
                                    follows from seriality of  )
2.               (positive introspection: 






tivity of  )
3.         (negative introspection: 
                                    follows from euclideanness of  )
BE B BE Ø Í Ø
B
B
Mistaken beliefs are possible: at g  p is false but the individual believes p
a b g d
¬p p p ¬p
If  { , },  then 








If - in addition to the previous properties - the "doxastic accessibility" 
relation  is   ( , ( )) then it is an 
- giving rise to a   of the set of states - 
w w w " ÎW Î B  B reflexive equivalence 
relation  partition and the associated
belief operator satisfies the additional property that  ,      
(beliefs are correct). In this case we speak of    and the associated 
operator is denoted by    rather th
E BE E
K





interactive  belief and common belief
Set of individuals N and a binary relation Bi for everyi N Î
1
2
a b g d
p p p ¬p p
1 2
1 2 2 1 2
Let  { , , } :  the event that represents the proposition 
Then   { , , }, { , }
{ },
E p
K E K E
K K E K K K E
a b g





An event E is commonly believed if (1) everybody believes it, 
(2) everybody believes that everybody believes it,  
(3) everybody believes that everybody believes that everybody 
believes it, etc.
Define the “everybody believes” operator Be as follows:
1 2 ...
e
n B E B E B E B E = Ç Ç Ç
The common belief operator B* is defined as follows:
* ...





Let     be the   of   ...
Thus  ( )  if and only if there exists a sequence
,...,   in     such that
(1)   
(2)   































1 1 1 ( ) ( ) { }, ( ) { } a b a g g = = = B B B
2 2 2 ( ) { }, ( ) ( ) { , } a a b g b g = = = B B B
* * * ( ) { }, ( ) ( ) { , , } a a b g a b g = = = B B B11
a b g
1 :





* *     if and only if   ( ) . B E E w w Î Í PROPOSITION.  B
1 2
1 2 2 1
*
Let  { , } :  the event that represents the proposition 
Then   { }, { , },
In fact, while { },    
E p
B E B E







Î = Ï =Æ
=Æ12
Module 3
Models of games and Rationality
Definition. A finite strategic-form game with ordinal payoffs is a quintuple 
{ } { } , , , , i i i N i N N S O z
Î Î  
{1,..., }  is a set of 
  is a finite set of   or choices of player 
  is a set of 
 is player  's ordering of   (  means that, for player  ,




S strategies i N
O outcomes




¢    
1
east as good as outcome  )
:  (where  ... ) associates an outcome with every
                  strategy profile   
n
o
z S O S S S
s S
¢
® = ´ ´
Î13
Definition. Given a strategic-form game with ordinal payoffs
{ } { } , , , , i i i N i N N S O z
Î Î  
a reduced form of it is a triple
{ } { } , , i i i N i N N S u
Î Î
where   :   is such that   ( ) ( )  if and only if   ( ) ( ) i i i i u S u s u s z s z s ¢ ¢ ® ³ ℝ  














D 1 , 3 0 , 3 0 , 2
4 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2
3 , 1 2 , 2














D 1 , 8 0 , 8 1 , 0
8 , 2 2 , 5 2 , 5
2 , 0 3 , 3
0 , 4 6 , 4 9 , 6
SAME AS14
Definition. An epistemic model of a strategic-form game is an 
interactive belief structure together with n functions 
: ( ) i i S i N s W ® Î
Interpretation:   si(w) is player i’s chosen strategy at state w
Restriction: if   ( )  then   ( ) ( ) i i i w w s w s w ¢ ¢ Î = B
(no player has mistaken beliefs about her own strategy)15
1
2














D 1 , 3 0 , 3 0 , 2
4 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2
3 , 1 2 , 2




A C C D
f f g g
At every state each player knows his
own strategy 
At state   player 1 plays C (he knows this) not knowing whether player 2 is playing f or g
and player 2 plays f (she knows this) not knowing whether player 1 is playing A or C
b16
Non-probabilistic (no expected utility) and very weak notion of rationality
RATIONALITY
Definition. Player i is  IRRATIONAL at state w if there is a 
strategy si (of player i) which she believes to be better than si(w) 
(that is, if she believes that she can do better with another strategy)
Player i is RATIONAL at state w  if and only if she is not irrational
Player  1  is  rational  at  state  b
1
2














D 1 , 3 0 , 3 0 , 2
4 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2
3 , 1 2 , 2
0 , 1 3 , 1 3 , 2
1's strategy:
2's strategy:
A C C D
f f g g
4 , 117
Let si and ti be two strategies of player i: , i i i s t S Î
i i i s t ≻ is interpreted as  “strategy si is better for player i than strategy ti ”
is true at state w  if ( , ( )) ( , ( )) i i i i i i u s u t s w s w - - >
that is, si is better than ti against s-i(w )
i i i s t ≻
profile of strategies chosen 














C 4 , 1 0 , 2 1 , 2
3 , 1 2 , 2





1 A B ≻ 1 B A ≻ 1 C B ≻
1 A C ≻ 1 B C ≻ 1 C A ≻
1 B C ≻ 1 A C ≻ 1 B A ≻
2 E F ≻ 2 F G ≻ 2 F G ≻ etc.18
Let Ri be the event representing the proposition “player i is rational”
{ } Let   : ( , ( )) ( , ( )) i i i i i i i i i s t u s u t w s w s w - - = ÎW > ≻ event that si is better than ti
If  si Î Si,  let  { } : ( ) i i s s w s w = ÎW = event that player i chooses si
i i i i i s B t s Ç Í Ø ≻ i R
( )
i i i i
i i i i i
s S t S
s B t s
Î Î
Ø = Ç ≻ ∪ ∪ i R
... = Ç Ç 1 n R R R all players are rational19
1
2














D 1 , 3 0 , 3 0 , 2
4 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2
3 , 1 2 , 2
0 , 1 3 , 1 3 , 2
1's strategy:
2's strategy:
A C C D
f f g g
R1 ¬R1
K R 1 2
K R 2 1 K R 2 1 ¬K R 2 1 ¬K R 2 1
K K R 1 2 1 ¬K K R 1 2 1 ¬K K R 1 2 1 ¬K K R 1 2 1
¬K K K R 2 1 2 1
R1 R1
R2 R2 R2 R2
K R 1 2 K R 1 2 K R 1 2
1 2
1 2 2 1 2
{ , , }, { , , , }
{ , , , }, { , }
{ },
K K
K K K K K
a b g a b g d











At state a there is mutual 
knowledge of rationality but not 
common knowledge of rationality20
1 1 1 Let   ... ... i i i n S S S S S - - + = ´ ´ ´ ´ ´ set of strategy profiles of all players except i
. Let   , . We say that   is   by 
if   ( , ) ( , )  for all  
i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
s t S t strictly dominated s

















D 1 , 3 0 , 3 0 , 2
4 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2
3 , 1 2 , 2






C 4 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2
3 , 1 2 , 2
0 , 1 3 , 1 3 , 2





C 1 , 2 1 , 2
2 , 2





B 2 , 2








ITERATED DELETION OF STRICTLY DOMINATED STRATEGIES21
Let G be a strategic-form game with ordinal payoffs and G¥ be the game obtained 
after applying the procedure of Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies. 
Let S¥ denote the strategy profiles of game G¥















D 1 , 3 0 , 3 0 , 2
4 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2
3 , 1 2 , 2










a b g d
1's strategy:
2's strategy:
A C C A
f f e e
S¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ = {d d d d}22
*    B Í PROPOSITION 1. R S
¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
If at a state it is commonly believed that all players are rational, then the strategy profile
chosen at that state belongs to the game obtained after applying the iterated deletion of 
strictly dominated strategies. 
1
2














D 1 , 3 0 , 3 0 , 2
4 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2
3 , 1 2 , 2
0 , 1 3 , 1 3 , 2
1's strategy:
2's strategy:
A C C D
f f g g
R1 ¬R1
K R 1 2
K R 2 1 K R 2 1 ¬K R 2 1 ¬K R 2 1
K K R 1 2 1 ¬K K R 1 2 1 ¬K K R 1 2 1 ¬K K R 1 2 1
¬K K K R 2 1 2 1
R1 R1
R2 R2 R2 R2
K R 1 2 K R 1 2 K R 1 2 At state   there cannot be 
common knowledge of rationality







Every normal operator   satisfies the property 
that if   then  .
  is a normal operator. Thus from   
it follows that  .
By transitivity of   we have that 
  for every even
B
E F BE BF
B B
B B B








¥ ¥ ¥ ¥




Thus    







R S¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
1
2














D 1 , 3 0 , 3 0 , 2
4 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2
3 , 1 2 , 2


















REMARK.  In general it is not true that * B Í S R














D 1 , 3 0 , 3 0 , 2
4 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2
3 , 1 2 , 2
0 , 1 3 , 1 3 , 2 0 , 1 1
2
a b g d
1's strategy:
2's strategy:
A C C A
f f e e
S¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ = {d d d d}
2
{ , }, { , , , }
K






* K =Æ R25
*
  Fix a strategic-form game with ordinal payoffs   and let   .  
Then there exists an epistemic model of   and a state   such that  ( )   and   .
. G s S













B 4 , 2
3 , 3 3 , 2








a b g d













* In this model    and every
strategy profile occurs at some state
B = = W R R26
REMARK. Given the above notion of rationality, there is no 
difference between common belief of rationality and common 
knowledge of rationality. The previous two propositions can be 
restated in terms of knowledge and common knowledge.
*    K ¢ Í PROPOSITION 1 . R S¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
*
  Fix a strategic-form game with ordinal payoffs   and let   .  
Then there exists an epistemic model of   and a state   such that  ( )   and   .
. G s S





Still non-probabilistic (no expected utility) 
STRONGER NOTION OF RATIONALITY
Definition. Player i is  IRRATIONAL at state w if there is a 
strategy si which she believes to be at least as good as si(w) and she 
considers it possible that si is better than si(w)
Player i is RATIONAL at state w  if and only if she is not irrational
Player  1  is  irrational  at  state  b: B is at least as good as C at both b and g and 
















C 2 , 1 1 , 2 4 , 2
3 , 1 1 , 2





{ }, a = =Æ 1 2 R R28
i i i i i i i i i s B t s B t s Ç Ç Ø Ø Í Ø ≻ i R  
( )
i i i i
i i i i i i i i i
s S t S
s B t s B t s
Î Î
Ø = Ç Ç Ø Ø ≻ ∪ ∪ i R  
... = Ç Ç 1 n R R R all players are rational
Player i is  IRRATIONAL at state w if there is a strategy si which she believes to be at 
least as good as si(w) and she considers it possible that si is better than si(w)29
Definition.
{ } { } Given a game  , , , , , a subset of strategy
profiles   and a strategy profile  , we say that   is 
   if there exist a player   and a strategy   of player 
(thus   
i i N i N
i i
i
G N S O z
X S x X x








need not belong to the projection of   onto  ) such that:
1.   ( , ) ( , )  and
2.  for all  , if ( , )  then  ( , ) ( , ).
i
i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i
X S
z s x z x x
s S x s X z s s z x s
- -




1 1 1 1
1
 for   define
 recursively as follows:   and, for  1, 
\ , where   is the set of strategy profiles 
that are inferior relative to  . 
m
m m m m m
m
m
T S T S m
T T I I T
T














d e f d e f
A 2 , 1 0 , 1 2 , 1 A 2 , 1 0 , 1 2 , 1
B 1 , 0 1 , 0 1 , 1 B 1 , 0 1 , 1




d e f d e f
A 2 , 1 0 , 1 2 , 1 A 2 , 1 0 , 1 2 , 1
B B

















0 0 {( , ),( , ),( , ),( , ),( , ),( , ),( , ),( , ),( , )},  {( , ),( , )} (the elimination of ( , ) is 
done through player 2 and strategy  , while the elimination of ( , ) is done through player 




1 and strategy  ); 
 
{( , ),( , ),( , ),( , ),( , ),( , ),( , )},  ¹ {( , ),( , ),( , )} (the elimination of ( , ) and ( , ) is 
done through player 1 and strategy  , while the elimination of ( , ) i
B
T A d A e A f B d B f C d C e I B d B f C e B d B f
A C e
= =
s done through player 2 and strategy  );  
² {( , ),( , ),( , ),( , )},  ² {( , )} (the elimination of ( , ) is done through player 1 and strategy  ); 
 
³ {( , ),( , ),( , )},  ³ ; thus  ³.
d
T A d A e A f C d I C d C d A




*    K Í PROPOSITION  3. R T
¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
If at a state it is commonly known that all players are rational, then the strategy profile
chosen at that state belongs to the game obtained after applying the iterated deletion of 
Inferior strategy profiles. 
*
  Fix a strategic-form game with ordinal 
payoffs   and let   .  Then there exists an epistemic model 
of   and a state   such that  ( )   and   .
.
G s T





NOT TRUE if we replace common knowledge with common belief
c d
A 1 , 1 1 , 0
















{ , }, { , } a b a b = = 1 2 R R
There is common belief of 
rationality at every state and yet 
at state a the strategy profile 





Definition. A Bayesian frame is an interactive belief frame 
together with a collection                      of probability 
distributions on W such that
PROBABILISTIC BELIEFS




(1)  if   ( )  then  
(2)   ( ) 0  if and only if    ( )     




















2 : B 1/3 2/3
1/2 1/234
Definition. A strategic-form game with von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs
is a quintuple 
{ } { } , , , , i i i N i N N S O U z
Î Î
1
{1,..., }  is a set of 
  is the set of   of player 
  is a set of 
:    is player  's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function





S strategies i N
O outcomes
U O i




® = ´ ´
ℝ
outcome with every
                  strategy profile    s S Î
where
{ } { } Its reduced form is a triple  , ,  where  ( ) ( ( )). i i i i i N i N N S s U z s p p
Î Î =35
An epistemic model of a strategic-form game is a Bayesian frame 
together with n functions 
: ( ) i i S i N s W ® Î
such that if   ( )  then   ( ) ( ) i i i w w s w s w ¢ ¢ Î = B
Stronger definition of Rationality than the previous ones
Player i is RATIONAL at state a if her choice at a maximizes 
her expected payoff, given her beliefs at a:
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, , ( ), ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( )
i i
i i i i i i t p p
w a w a
























b g d e a













Player 1 is not rational at   because her expected payoff is  1 2
3 3 3
2 1






On the other hand, Player 1    rational at   because her expected payoff is  3 0
2 2 2
1 1 3
and if she had chosen strategy    her payoff would have been  1 2
2 2 2







ff would have been  0 3
2 2 2
+ =
{ , } d e = 1 R37
What are the implications of Common Belief of 
this stronger notion of rationality?
Definition. A mixed strategy of player i is a probability distribution over Si
The set of mixed strategies of player i is denoted by D(Si)
Let   and  ( ). We say that   is   by   if, 
for every   ,   ( ) ( , ) ( , )
i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
s S
i i i
t S S t strictly dominated
s S s s s t s
n n

























In this game strategy   of player 1 is 
A C















3 , 0 1 , 0 0 , 1
1 , 1 0 , 2 1 , 1
0 , 0 4 , 1 2 , 2

























3 , 0 1 , 0 0 , 1
0 , 0 4 , 1 2 , 2
0 , 3 1 , 0 3 , 2
(a) The game G
B is strictly dominated by (1/2 A, 1/2 D)
(b) The game G














(c) The game G






A 0 , 1
3 , 2




0 , 3 D
=  G
Player
    1




Let G be a strategic-form game with von Neumann-Morgenstern 
payoffs and G¥ be the game obtained after applying the procedure of  
Iterated Deletion of Pure Strategies that are Strictly Dominated by 
Possibly Mixed Strategies.
{ }
Let   denote the pure-strategy profiles of game 
Given a model of   , let   be the event  : ( )
m S G
G w s w
¥ ¥
ÎW Î m m S S
¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
*    B Í PROPOSITION  5. m R S
¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
*
  Fix a strategic-form game with von Neumann-Morgenstern 
payoffs   and let   .  Then there exists a Bayesian model of   and a state   such 
that  ( )   and   .
.








Given this stronger notion of rationality, there is a difference 
between common belief of rationality and common knowledge 
of rationality. The implications of common knowledge of 
rationality are stronger.
With knowledge, a player’s beliefs are always correct and are 
believed to be correct by every other player. Thus there is 
correctness and common belief of correctness of everybody’s 
beliefs.41
Definition. Given a strategic-form game with von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs G, a 
pure-strategy profile xÎX Í S is inferior relative to X if there exists a player i and a 
(possibly mixed) strategy ni of player i (whose support can be any subset of Si, not 
necessarily the projection of  X onto Si) such that: 
i
i
(1)   , ( , ) ( )  (  yields a higher expected payoff than   against  ) 





i i i i i i i i i i
s S
i i i i i i i i i i
s S
i
x s x s x x
















      Player    2 
    D  E  F 
Player  A  2  ,  0  2  ,  2  0  ,  2 
1  B  2  ,  2  1  ,  2  5  ,  1 
  C  2  ,  0  1  ,  0  1  ,  5 
 
Here (C,F) is inferior relative to S (for 
player 1, B weakly dominates C and is 
strictly better than C against F)
and (A,D) is inferior relative to S (for 
player 2, E weakly dominates D and is 
strictly better than D against A)42
 
      Player    2 
    D  E  F 
Player  A  2  ,  0  2  ,  2  0  ,  2 
1  B  2  ,  2  1  ,  2  5  ,  1 




s  = S, D
0
s  = {(A, D), (C, F)} 
 
 
      Player  2   
    D  E  F 
Player  A    2  ,  2  0  ,  2 
1  B  2  ,  2  1  ,  2   




s  = {(A, E), (A, F), (B,D), (B, E), (C, D) },   
D
2
s  = {(B, E)}. 
 
      Player    2 
    D  E  F 
Player  A    2  ,  2  0  ,  2 
1  B  2  ,  2  1  ,  2  5  ,  1 




s  = {(A, E), (A, F), (B,D), (B, E),  
(B, F), (C, D), (C, E)} 
D
1
s  = {(C, E), (B, F)} 
 
      Player    2 
    D  E  F 
Player  A    2  ,  2  0  ,  2 
1  B  2  ,  2     




s  = S
¥
s   = {(A, E), (A, F), (B,D),  
(C, D) },   D
3









Let G be a strategic-form game with von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs and G¥
be the game obtained after applying the procedure of  Iterated Deletion of 
Inferior Pure-Strategy Profiles.
{ }
Let   denote the pure-strategy profiles of game 
Given a model of   , let   be the event  : ( )
s S G
G w s w
¥ ¥
ÎW Î s s S S
¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
*    K Í PROPOSITION  7. s R S
¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
*
  Fix a strategic-form game with von Neumann-Morgenstern 
payoffs   and let   .  Then there exists a Bayesian model of   and a state   such 
that  ( )   and   .
.








      Player    2 
    D  E  F 
Player  A  2  ,  0  2  ,  2  0  ,  2 
1  B  2  ,  2  1  ,  2  5  ,  1 
  C  2  ,  0  1  ,  0  1  ,  5 
 
In this game   









Thus every strategy profile is compatible with common belief of rationality while 
only (A,E), (A,F), (B,D) and (C,D) are compatible with common knowledge of 
rationality45
CREDITS
The link between the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies and the informal notion 
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1999, pp. 149-225.
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EXTENSIVE GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION
• tree
• n  players
• assignment of one player 
to every non-terminal node
• assignment of an ordinal











































 1 to be rational)
(1 is rational)
(2 is rational)




STRATEGIES IN PERFECT-INFORMATION GAMES
Non-terminal nodes are 
called decision nodes
: set of decision nodes
: set of decision nodes assigned to player  i
X
X i
Definition. A strategy of player i is a function that assigns to every























Player 1’s strategies: 
(a,g), (a,h), (b,g) and (b,h)5


















ce cf de df
ag 2 , 2 2 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
ah 2 , 2 2 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
bg 1 , 3 0 , 3 1 , 3 0 , 3




EPISTEMIC MODEL OF A PERFECT-INFORMATION GAME
(Knowledge based)
:  satisfying i i S s W ®
if   ( )  then   ( ) ( ) i i i w w s w s w ¢ ¢ Î = K
• Set of states W
• Equivalence relation Ki on W for every player i
• For every player i a function
Thus a standard epistemic model for the associated strategic form7
Let si and ti be two strategies of player i: , i i i s t S Î
i i i s t ≻ is interpreted as  “strategy si is better for player i than strategy ti ”
is true at state w  if ( , ( )) ( , ( )) i i i i i i u s u t s w s w - - >
that is, si is better than ti against s-i(w )
i i i s t ≻
profile of strategies chosen 
by the players other than i
Recall from Lecture 1:
{ } Let   : ( , ( )) ( , ( )) i i i i i i i i i s t u s u t w s w s w - - = ÎW > ≻ event that si is better than ti
If  si Î Si,  let  { } : ( ) i i i s s w s w = ÎW = event that player i chooses si8
Let Ri
EA be the event representing the proposition “player i is ex ante rational”




i i i i
i i i i i
s S t S
s K t s
Î Î
Ø = Ç ≻ ∪ ∪
EA
i R
... = Ç Ç
EA EA EA
1 n R R R all players are rational
Recall from Lecture 1:
PROPOSITION: if at a state there is common knowledge of ex ante 
rationality then the strategy profile chosen at that state belongs to the game 
obtained by applying the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies; 
conversely, for every such strategy profile there is a model and a state 
where (1) the strategy profile is chosen and (2) there is common knowledge 
of ex ante rationality. 9
This notion of rationality is not sufficient 
to yield backward induction
Here there are no strictly 
dominated strategies
Thus every strategy profile is 
consistent with common 
belief/knowledge of ex ante 
rationality
ce cf de df
ag 2 , 2 2 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
ah 2 , 2 2 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
bg 1 , 3 0 , 3 1 , 3 0 , 3





















ce cf de df
ag 2 , 2 2 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
ah 2 , 2 2 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
bg 1 , 3 0 , 3 1 , 3 0 , 3




Here: ex ante rationality and common 



























(For 2 ce better than de at a but not at b, thus 
at a she does not know that ce is better.)11
Let Ri
EA/S be the event representing the proposition “player i is ex ante rational 
in a strong sense”




i i i i
i i i i i i i i i
s S t S
s K t s K t s
Î Î
Ø = Ç Ç Ø Ø ≻ ∪ ∪
EA/S
i R ￿
... = Ç Ç
EA/S EA/S EA/S
1 n R R R all players are rational in a 
strong sense
Recall from Lecture 1:
PROPOSITION: if at a state there is common knowledge of ex ante 
rationality in a strong sense then the strategy profile chosen at that state 
belongs to the set T
¥ of strategy profiles that survive the iterated deletion of 
inferior profiles; conversely, for every such strategy profile there is a model 
and a state where (1) the strategy profile is chosen and (2) there is common 
knowledge of ex ante rationality in a strong sense. 12
ce cf de df
ag 2 , 2 2 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
ah 2 , 2 2 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
bg 1 , 3 0 , 3 1 , 3 0 , 3
bh 1 , 3 2 , 1 1 , 3 2 , 1
ce cf de
ag 2 , 2 2 , 2 1 , 1
ah 2 , 2 2 , 2 1 , 1
bg 1 , 3
bh 1 , 3 1 , 3
ce cf de
ag 2 , 2 2 , 2
ah 2 , 2 2 , 2
bg 1 , 3
bh 1 , 3
player 1 using ah
player 2 using cf
player 2 using ce























Thus even common knowledge of  ex ante rationality in a 
strong sense is not sufficient to yield backward induction
In this example all the strategy profiles in T¥ are Nash equilibria. Is it the case that 
common knowledge of ex ante rationality in the strong sense gives Nash equilibrium 
play in perfect information games? 13

































a3 There is no Nash equilibrium that yields the play a1d2 (the 
Nash equilibria are marked in blue)
1 2 3 3
1 2 3 2
First round: eliminate ( , , ) through player 3 and 
second round: eliminate ( , , ) through player 2 and 
a a d a
a d a a
a2 d2 a2 d2 a2 d2 a2 d2
a1 4,4,4 2,2,2 1,1,1 2,2,2 a1 4,4,4 2,2,2 2,2,2
d1 3,3,3 3,3,3 3,3,3 3,3,3 d1 3,3,3 3,3,3 3,3,3 3,3,3
a2 d2 a2 d2
a1 4,4,4 2,2,2
d1 3,3,3 3,3,3 3,3,3 3,3,3
a3 d3
a3 d3 a3 d314
















 At state   node   is   
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Going beyond ex ante rationality15
1
a b
c d e f
g h
x0






a b g d e
ag bh bg bh bg
2's strategy: df df ce de cf
( ) { }
 Given an epistemic model, for every
node  , let     be the event that node   is reached:  
: ( )
x x x




{ }, { , , , }
{ , }, , { },   etc.
x x
x z z
a b g d e
b e a
= =
= = Æ =16
Let   ,   be two events. 
Denote by     the event     (if   then  )
E F




RN be the event representing the proposition “player i is rational at 
reached nodes”
( ) i i i i i x s K x t s Ç Ç ® Í Ø ≻
RN
i R
( ) ( )
i i i i i
i i i i i
x X s S t S
s K x t s x
Î Î Î
Ø = Ç ® Ç ≻ ∪ ∪ ∪
RN
i R
... = Ç Ç
RN RN RN
1 n R R R all players are rational
at reached nodes
















2 2 2 { } d a a = ≻ 2 { , , } x a b e = 2 2 2 2 { , , } x d a a g d Ø È = ≻
( ) 2 2 2 2 2 K x d a ® =Æ ≻ Thus player 2 is rational at nodes a and b and trivially at g.
2 2 2 { , } a d b e = ≻ 2 2 2 2 { , , , } x a d b g d e Ø È = ≻ 2 { , , } x a b e =
( ) 2 2 2 2 2 { , } K x a d d e ® = ≻ ( ) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 { } x d K x a d e Ç Ç ® = ≻
Thus player 2 is trivially rational at state d, and irrational at e e e e.
* K =Æ R
a b g d e
a1d3 a1a3 d1a3 d1a3 a1a3
a2 a2 a2 d2 d2
1:
2:18
Backward Induction terminating games
Definition. A BI terminating game is a perfect information game where 
(1) at each decision node there is a choice the terminates the game (it leads to a 
terminal node) and (2) the backward-induction solution prescribes a terminating 
choice at every decision node.
The best-known example is 
the centipede game (n is the 
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2 1 1
for 1
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If   is even
( ) ( ) 1
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If   is odd
( ) ( ) 1




u z u z





Definition. Given an epistemic model of a BI terminating game, let BI be the event that 















a1 a b g d e
a1d3 a1a3 d1a3 d1a3 a1a3























 In every BI terminating game, 
 For every BI terminating game, there is a 











Aumann, R., A note on the centipede game, Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, 23: 97-105.
Broome, J. and W. Rabinowicz, Bacwards induction in the centipede game, Analysis, 1999, 59:237-242.
Rabinowicz, W., Grappling with the centipede, Economics and Philosophy, 1998, 14: 95-126.
Sugden, R., Rational choice: a survey of contributions from economics and philosophy, Economic Journal, 1991, 101:751-785.
Note: it is not necessarily the case that if w Î W is such that at w there is 
common knowledge of rationality then  s(w) coincides with the backward-
induction strategy profile. What is true is that player 1’s strategy assigns the 






















In general perfect-information games common knowledge of 





















The backward induction 
play is l1l2 while in this 
model we get r1l3
(r1,r2l3) is a Nash equilibrium. Does common knowledge of Rationality at Reached 
Nodes at least yield a play that can be sustained by a Nash equilibrium?22






































a2 d2 a2 d2
a1 4,4,4 2,2,2 1,1,1 2,2,2
d1 3,3,3 3,3,3 3,3,3 3,3,3
a3 d3
The Nash equilibria are marked in blue23
Let     be a decision node of player  . Denote by   the set of player  's 
strategies in the subgame that starts at node  .
x

























{ , , , }, { , }
{ , , , }, { , }, { , }
x
x x
S ag ah bg bh S g h
S cd cf de df S c d S e f
= =
= = =
Dealing with general perfect-information games24
Let x be a decision node of player i and let ,
x x x
i i i s t S Î
x x
i i i s t ≻
is true at state w  if, starting from node x, 
Let     be the event that     is true.
x x x x
i i i i i i s t s t ≻ ≻
{ } If  , let    : ( )|
x x x x
i i i i i x s S s s w s w Î = ÎW =
be two strategies of player i in the subgame that starts at node x
is interpreted as "for player  , strategy   is better than strategy 
in the subgame that starts at node  "
x x
i i i s t
x
   gives a higher payoff to player   than    against  ( )
x x
i i i s i t s w -
x x
i i i s t ≻
If   is a node of player  , let  ( )|  denote the restriction of 







Recall that if   , ,       is the event     (if   then  ) E F E F E F E F Í W ® Ø È
Let Ri
SR be the event representing the proposition “player i is substantively rational”
( )
x x x
i i i i i s K t s Ç Í Ø ≻
SR
i R
( ) ( )
x x
i i i i i
x x x
i i i i i
x X s S t S
s K t s
Î Î Î
Ø = Ç ≻ ∪ ∪ ∪
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i R
... = Ç Ç
SR SR SR
1 n R R R all players are 
substantively rational
if   i x X Î




{ , , } (  rationality)
{ , } (rationality at reached nodes)










































 In every perfect information game, 
 For every perfect information game, there is a 











Aumann, R., Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality, Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 8: 6-19.28
Why is player 2 substantively irrational at state a? What is true at state a that makes player 
2 substantively irrational?
At state a player 2 is not taking any actions, because her node x2 is not reached. In fact, at 
state a player 2  knows that her node is not reached. So what makes her irrational 
(according to the notion of substantive rationality) must be her plan to choose d2 if her 
































The association of a strategy profile with every state gives rise to two types of counterfactuals:
(1) An objective statement about what the relevant player would do at a node that is not 
reached.
(2) (With the help of the partitions) a subjective statement about what a player believes would 
happen if he were to take a different action from the one he is actually taking. 
(1) Thus at state g it is true that player 2 would take action a2 if her node x2 were to 
be reached (although it is not in fact reached and she knows that it is not reached)
(2) At states b and g player 1 knows that if he were to take action a1 instead of d1 at 


















Modeling counterfactuals indirectly through strategies is not satisfactory. We have 
abandoned the modular approach suggested in Lecture 1, since there exists a module 
that deals with counterfactuals.
Modeling Counterfactuals
For every  , let   be a relation on   satisfying,  , ,
(1) either  ( ) or  ( )                  (completeness)
(2) if  ( ) then  ( ) ( )              (transitivity)
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P ( ) then      (antisymmetry)




w w w W
Î =
¢ ¢ Î Î
P
P
The interpretation of  ( ) or   is that state   is at least as close to
to state   as state   is. Thus, for every state  , the closeness relation   determines 
a strict ordering of the set of sta
w w
w




tes based on closeness to  , with   itself being the 
closest state.
w w
( ) = set of states that are not closer to   than   is. w a w a P31
REPRESENTATION
{ , , , } W a b g d =




















Given a state w and an event E, denote by min(w,E) the closest state 
to w that belongs to event E. Thus if w Î E, then min(w,E) = w.
In the above example, if  { , } then min( , ) =  E E b d a b =32
Recall that, if    ,   are two events,     denotes the event     
(if   then  ). Thus   if either   or  .
 represents the material conditional, which is true whenever the antecedent is
E F E F E F
E F E F E E F w w w
Í W ® Ø È
Î ® Ï Î Ç
®  false
We use the symbol  ￿ to denote the counterfactual conditional. 
Thus  E ￿ F  is interpreted as “if E were the case then F would be 
the case”
{ }    :min( , ) E F E F w W w = Î Î Definition. ￿


















If  { , } and  { , , }
then   { , }











Note that, for all  , ,    E F E F E F W Í Í ® ￿33
MODELING STRATEGIES WITH COUNTERFACTUALS
i
Given a perfect information game define an epistemic model of it as before, but with
the following changes:
(1) replace the   functions  :  with a single function  :  where 
        is the set of pl
n S d P
P
s W W ® ®
{ }
ays of the game written in terms of actions taken,








































We add two more requirements: 
(3) for every play there is at least one state where that play is realized 
(4) if, at a state, node x of player i is reached and he takes action a there,
then he knows that if x is reached he takes action a: 
( )
2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
{ , , }, , }
{ , , , }
{ , , }
x a a
x a x a
K x a
a b e b
a b g d
a b g
= ={
® = Ø È =
® =
( ) i a K x a Í ®
















































EXTRACTING STRATEGIES FROM A MODEL
Given a model we can extract a strategy profile at every state as follows. 
If si is a strategy of player i and xi is a decision node of player i, denote by 
si(xi) the choice prescribed by siat xi .
Define si(w) as follows: si(w)(xi) = ci if and only if i i x c wÎ ￿
1 1 3 1 1 3
1 1 3 3
1 1 3 3
1 1 3 3
( ) , ( )
( )  (for node   we use state  )
( )  (for node   we use state  )
( )  (for node   we use state  )
















( ) , ( )
( )  (for node   we use state  )













































In this model it is not true that players 
know their own strategies. E.g. player 
1 at state g
In order for a counterfactual model to give rise to a standard model based on 
strategies, we need to impose a further condition:
( ) ( ) (5)   i i i i i x c K x c ® ￿ ￿











































RE-DEFINING  RATIONALITY AT REACHED NODES
i
Let   be a decision node of player   and   and   be two 
choices of player   at  .
If   is a number, let   be the event that player  's payoff is  .
If   and   are numbers, let    if   and 
i i i
i
x i c c
i x





> = W > ℓ ℓ ℓ     otherwise. k > = Æ ℓ


















































































































use b use e use b
Thus no common 











































































































































i i R R
Redefining substantive rationality (Stalnaker’s notion)
rationality at all nodes: reached and un-reached
Does common knowledge of substantial rationality so 
defined imply the backward-induction play?41
{ , }











At state a there is common knowledge of substantive rationality. The following is true at a: 
(1) 1 is materially rational at x1 : 1 knows that if he played a1 then 2 would play d2. [state b b b b]
(2) 2 is materially rational (does not do anything) but also substantively rational: if x2 were 
reached [state b b b b] then player 2 would be materially rational (she would play d2 knowing 
that if she played a2 then 1 would play d3) [state d d d d].















a b g d
1:
2:
a a a a
b b b b
g g g g
d
b b b b
d d d d
g
a








d1 a1d2 a1a2a3 a1a2d342
Stalnaker (1998 p. 48)
Player 2 has the following initial belief: player 1 
would choose a3 on her second move if she had a second 
move. This is a causal ‘if’ – an ‘if’ used to express 2’s 
opinion about 1’s disposition to act in a situation that 
they both know will not arise. Player 2 knows that since 
player 1 is rational, if she somehow found herself at her 
second node, she would choose a3 . But to ask what 
player 2 would believe about player 1 if he learned that 
he was wrong about 1’s first choice is to ask a 
completely different question – this ‘if’ is epistemic; it 
concerns player 2’s belief revision policies, and not 
player 1’s disposition to be rational. No assumption 
about player 1’s substantive rationality, or about player 
2’s knowledge of her substantive rationality, can imply 
that player 2 should be disposed to maintain his belief 
that she will act rationally on her second move even were 
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a a a a
b b b b
g g g g
d
b b b b
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g
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d1 a1d2 a1a2a3 a1a2d343
The corresponding strategy-based model is:
According to Aumann, player 2 is not 
substantively rational at a: player 2 is 
planning to play d2 knowing that player 
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g g g g
d
b b b b
d d d d
g
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d1 a1d2 a1a2a3 a1a2d3
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1:
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a a a a
b b b b
g g g g
d
b b b b
d d d d
g
a








d1 a1d2 a1a2a3 a1a2d3
( ) ( ) 2 3 3 2 2 3 3  and also   K x a x K x d a a Î Î ￿ ￿ ￿
Thus what player 2 believes about player 1’s behavior in the hypothetical world 
where node x3 is reached changes going from node x1 (where the game ends 
without node x2 being reached) to the hypothetical world where x2 is reached. If 
one imposes the constraint that such changes cannot happen, then common 
knowledge of substantive rationality implies the backward-induction play.45
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